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PANEL IV: SECRECY AND THE COURTS:
THE JUDGES' PERSPECTIVE
DEAN WEXLER: Good afternoon. Welcome to our final panel
on secrecy and the courts, the judges' perspective.
Today's panels have considered secret justice from the
perspective of reconciling the interests of plaintiffs, defendants,
government agencies, the press and the public. We have already
focused on how the judiciary could resolve conflicting interests
among parties over secrecy without particular consideration of the
judicial interest involved.
Of course, secrecy in judicial proceedings can have another
consequence. Even when all the parties desire secrecy, in some
cases, at least, a judge may be concerned that the effect of keeping
information under wraps would erode public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process and the judiciary itself. How far
should a judge go in resisting secrecy in such a case? That is the
topic for this afternoon's panel. And we have an enormously
distinguished panel of judges to ponder it.
Brief highlights from their biographies are provided in your
program. As you might have guessed, they have all graduated from
college and law school. Almost all of them serve on the bench of
the Southern District of New York and we consider them imports
to our home district, the Eastern District, which is represented here
by Judge David G. Trager.
I thought that by way of introducing them I would tell you
some things that you would not necessarily know about them from
appearing before them or reading their opinions or reading about
them in the papers.
To my left is Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, who obviously wants
to get the most out of her lifetime tenure. Every morning Judge
Scheindlin wakes up at 5:30 a.m. and spends an hour working out
at the gym before she even goes to her chambers. When you are
having your first cup of coffee, she is having lunch.
To my right is Judge Denise Cote. Now, when she wants a
change of venue, she usually opts for an exotic one. And there are
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no phones. I personally have tried to reach her and have been told
there is no way of reaching her. Her fora non conveniens have
included two-week rafting adventures and gorilla watching in
Rwanda.
Judge Sidney H. Stein and Judge John G. Koeltl are both
athletes. Judge Stein is a cross-country runner. In fact, he has run
marathons and he has ridden his bicycle from Manhattan to
Montauk and also around the Gaspe Peninsula. Judge Koeltl plays
a mean game of tennis. His doubles partners or opponents are
almost all well-known government or defense attorneys.
Judge John S. Martin, Jr. has cross-country aspirations of his
own, but he plans to fulfill them by traveling around the United
States in a Winnebago. And, by the way, this audience will be
particularly interested in knowing that it was Judge Martin who
ruled that West Publishing Company could not claim a copyright
in the actual judicial decisions that it reprinted in its reporter series
and its online services.1
And, at last, and, as he would be the first to tell you, definitely
not least, is our beloved Judge David G. Trager. Now, I could tell
you many things about David, but I want to keep my job. Judge
Trager was born in Flatbush, Brooklyn, and as a child used to
travel with the Brooklyn Dodgers. It occurs to me as I look out at
all of you seated here, there is something I can tell you that will
clear up a mystery for any of you who have visited his chambers.
It was Judge Trager who selected the seats that you are sitting in
this afternoon. And that is why, as some of you may have noticed,
he actually has a pair of these auditorium seats in his chambers
right next to his desk.
So now you know why this symposium has not only been
informative and really terrific thus far, but exceedingly comfortable
for you all as well. I invite you to sit back in your seats while we
turn to the hypotheticals.2 You all have them and our hope here on
Matthew Bender Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94-0589, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6915, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997).
2 Dean Wexler had prepared a series of hypotheticals that served as the basic
structure of the panel discussion. After reading the hypotheticals to the audience
and the panel, the panelists then responded directly during the discussion.
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the panel is to be somewhat informal. This is not a shy group. So
I hope that they will jump right in.
We will start with the first hypothetical about unsealing grand
jury submissions. As is well known, in connection with the grand
jury investigations in the Monica Lewinsky matter, the United
States District Court in Washington, D.C. sealed almost all matters
pertaining to those proceedings in an effort to safeguard grand jury
secrecy. The most central of these matters were various claims of
evidentiary and constitutional privileges asserted by associates of
the President. The sealing included legal briefs, oral arguments,
judicial decisions and even docket sheets, so that the public had no
idea what types of arguments and assertions were being made.
Although the press will often seek to intervene to assert the
public's right to know, what is the judge's role to resist secrecy
because of its impact on the judiciary and the public's perception
of it?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: 3 With respect to the grand jury
context, I think that the judge's role here is a minimal one. Grand
juries are traditionally secret and there are good reasons for that.
There really are investigations, ongoing investigations, and people
who undergo investigations often never come further than that.
People are not always indicted. People are not always before the
public and a dangerous question presents itself as to how much
should become public in this very investigatory and early stage.
I think one of the dangers for a judge is to assume that she has
the knowledge to opine that this proceeding should be open or that
one should be closed. The truth is, a judge does not know very
much about the goings on of a grand jury proceeding. In fact, most
often there is a huge investigatory mechanism that is really going
on behind the scenes, and it has little to do with the judiciary.
Again, I must stress that in the grand jury area I am not sure the
' United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. A
graduate of the University of Michigan and Cornell Law School, Judge
Scheindlin was appointed to the federal bench in 1994. She served as a law clerk
to the Honorable Charles L. Brieant of the Southern District of New York, as an
Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York, as General
Counsel to the New York City Department of Investigations, and as a Magistrate
Judge in the Eastern District of New York.
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judiciary has an independent reason, in terms of the integrity of the
institution, to worry about the secrecy that is there by statute.4
Now, it is true that the press or an outside party often seeks to
open some material such as the ancillary proceedings that were
sought to be opened in the Lewinsky case. Obviously, the judge
needs to consider that request. But at the court's own initiative, sua
sponte, I am troubled by that in the grand jury context. I would not
feel that, as a matter of the court's integrity, as an institution, we
need to do that.
JUDGE MARTIN:5 I think that keeping specific facts that may
relate to a grand jury investigation secret is certainly something
that the prosecutor knows better than the judges he or she is
appearing before. But, having been a federal prosecutor for a good
part of my life, and now sitting as a federal judge, I have become
more wary of completely relying on what the prosecutor does.
It seems to me that in the matters referred to in the first
hypothetical problem there are overriding public interests that have
nothing to do with the need for grand jury secrecy. Obviously,
what the grand jury is investigating and what the witnesses are
saying are matters traditionally covered by grand jury secrecy.
When the President of the United States, however, comes into an
investigation of which he is a well known subject and begins to
assert governmental privilege to block certain inquiries in the grand
jury, it seems to me, that is a matter of public importance. A judge,
therefore, has an obligation to examine whether the papers and
arguments can be redacted in a way that will protect grand jury
4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e)(2) announces a general rule of grand
jury secrecy. In relevant part, the rule provides that no person shall "disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury" subject to certain enumerated
exceptions. Id. These exceptions, among many others, include disclosure at the
direction of the court or presentation of the same facts to a separate grand jury.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C).
' United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. A
graduate of Manhattan College and Columbia University Law School, Judge
Martin was appointed to the federal bench in 1990. He served as law clerk to the
Honorable Leonard P. Moore of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, as Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States, and as
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
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secrecy, but still make a public record of what is a matter of
important public concern.
JUDGE KOELTL: 6 I share Judge Scheindlin's views. It seems
to me that when a judge imposes himself or herself into the grand
jury process and requires disclosure, the judge is essentially acting
as an advocate for the public interest. In doing so, the judge must
balance competing interests. A judge must, for example, consider
(1) whether all of the parties to the grand jury proceeding are
claiming that there are important reasons for the government
investigation; (2) the privacy rights of individuals not to have their
identities disclosed, because they may be the subjects or targets of
the investigation; and (3) whether the details of what the grand jury
is investigating inevitably point to one or more individuals. Here,
a judge must be extremely cautious about dismissing the views of
the parties.
This all, however, plays out somewhat differently on appeal
where the arguments are far more crystallized. It would not be
uncommon to have the court of appeals write, in cases like United
States v. Doe,7 about what the underlying facts were and the
established law that you can apply in the context of grand juries.
The court of appeals can do it in a published opinion, and on a
level of generality where you do not know, for example, which
corporation was involved, or who the employees were who were
involved. The court of appeals can also write on such a general
level that the law is established, but the opinion does not interfere
6 United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. A
graduate of Georgetown University and Harvard Law School, Judge Koeltl was
appointed to the federal bench in 1994. Judge Koeltl served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Edward Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York and to the
Honorable Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court. Judge Koeltl also
served as an Assistant Special Prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
Department of Justice and later became a partner with the law fimn of Debevoise
& Plimpton.
7 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the compelled production of a
witness' calendar pursuant to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum did not violate
the witness' Fifth Amendment privilege where the calendar had been voluntarily
prepared and where the act of producing it was not testimonial because the
witness had previously produced a copy to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the government could authenticate the calendar).
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with the rights either of the government investigation or of the
individual. In reading many of those court of appeals cases, 8 I still
have not been able to determine who the corporations or the
individuals were who were actually involved in those decisions.
JUDGE STEIN:9 There is one interest we have not talked
about in the context of this grand jury discussion - the interest of
transparency in the process. By that I mean that there is an
independent interest in having what we as judges do in our
courtrooms be transparent and obvious to the public.
One of the reasons the federal judiciary enjoys the high regard
and confidence of the people that it does, is that by and large our
system is very transparent, very open. The public interest in
transparency is different from the particular interests of the
litigants. However, if there ever were a case where the interest of
transparency should yield to other interests, it is in the context of
a grand jury proceeding where a wide range of other rights are
implicated, specifically the rights of the targets and the subjects of
the investigation.
If there were hard and fast answers to any of these questions
we would not have a panel discussion on the subject. On all these
issues, however, we have to consider the ability of the public to see
what the court system - and specifically, judges - are doing and
what their decisions are based upon. At some point, perhaps at the
point of grand jury submission, that interest in transparency yields
to other, more critical interests.
JUDGE TRAGER: 10 Well, I am with my colleague at the
8 See, e.g., In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29,
1999, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999); Doe, 1 F.3d at 88-90; In re Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae [sic] Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 1985, 793 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1986).
9 United States District Judge, Southern District of New York. A graduate
of Princeton University and Yale Law School, Judge Stein was appointed to the
federal bench in 1995. Judge Stein served as a law clerk to the Honorable
Stanley H. Fuld, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and was a
member of the law firm of Stein, Zauderer, Ellenhorn, Frisher & Sharp.
10 United States District Court Judge, Eastern District of New York. Judge
Trager received his undergraduate degree from Columbia University and his
LL.B. from Harvard Law School. Judge Trager served as law clerk to Chief
Judge Stanley H. Fuld and Associate Judge Kenneth H. Keating of the New York
Court of Appeals. Judge Trager was the United States Attorney for the Eastern
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other end of the bench, Judge Martin. In fact, the source of the idea
for this program was what went on in the Washington courtroom
during the Lewinsky litigation.1" "Grand jury secrecy" was used
as a sort of talisman for judges to avoid doing their jobs, as
difficult as it might be. As Judge Stein noted, the judiciary is
probably the most respected branch of government in the country,
in good part because of its openness. And we are at risk as an
institution if we do anything that permits unnecessary secrecy.
It should not matter, therefore, that the press was greatly
interested in the Monica Lewinsky case. It could be any case. We
have an independent institutional interest in seeking to avoid
unnecessary secrecy. And although the phrase "grand jury secrecy"
was tossed about in the Washington case, no one really analyzed
the issue closely. I hate to criticize a fellow federal judge whom I
have never met, but procedures do matter. Process makes for more
careful consideration of the issues at stake. In the Lewinsky matter,
however, the process was, as a practical matter, ignored.
Moreover, many of the arguments proffered for the need for
secrecy in the Monica Lewinsky case were secrets to no one. No
effort was made to parse out those areas that truly had to be kept
confidential, as opposed to the parts that the parties claimed for
unrelated reasons had to be kept secret. Furthermore, people should
understand that major constitutional decisions were being made on
important and novel issues of constitutional law that had never
been decided before and were being decided in a closed courtroom
and in an appeal that was not even docketed.
As I said, the federal judiciary has an independent institutional
interest in avoiding that kind of situation. In the long run, our
credibility as judges and the respect that we enjoy with the
American people will be lost if we, in effect, leave it to the
litigants or the press to protect our institutional interest in open-
ness.
District of New York from 1974 to 1978 and the former Dean and Professor of
Law at Brooklyn Law School from 1978 to 1993.
" In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499-506 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 820 (1998) (deciding various motions brought by members
of the media to allow press access to the different proceedings related to the
special prosecutor's investigations involving Monica Lewinsky).
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JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: A brief rebuttal. First, based upon the
Lewinsky case, which I think is an exceptional one-of-a-kind case
that we may never see again and we may never have seen before,
it would be dangerous to generalize about anything to do with
grand jury secrecy. Because, as Judge Trager correctly noted,
everybody knew who the witnesses were; everybody knew who the
targets were. They were leaving the grand jury and going directly
to the television cameras and giving interviews. They were
repeating their testimony by the hour and by the minute. This is
atypical of a grand jury investigation and there should be no
mistake as to that point left on this panel. This is not what goes on
in a typical grand jury investigation.
Typically, people's safety and lives may be at stake, or other
very important interests, and people may have high stakes in
maintaining that privacy. I want to add that in the Lewinsky case,
the press did seek access to the grand jury material. This was not
something the court thought up. Therefore, again, the Lewinsky
case is not an appropriate example for our topic of the court's role
in sua sponte resisting grand jury secrecy. Of course, the press
submitted motions in the district court seeking the information, and,
of course, they appealed to the circuit court.1 2 There was plenty
of outside interest.
I thought our topic to some degree was whether we have an
institutional interest ourselves in saying, "Wait a minute, this grand
jury does not need to be secret." And that is where I was troubled.
I do not think that a judge should insert the judiciary into the grand
jury process and into the issue of grand jury secrecy unless an
outside interest is brought to our attention. Then, of course, judges
12 Id. at 499-506 (holding that the press' motions seeking access to all
proceedings, papers and transcripts related to Monica Lewinsky's objections to
the grand jury subpoena or President Clinton's motions against Kenneth Starr for
alleged violation of grand jury secrecy were to be remanded for reconsideration).
The Dow Jones court specifically noted that in light of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), "the press must take a narrow view of the purported First
Amendment right of access." Id. at 500. Indeed, the court rested its conclusions
upon "[a] settled proposition" that "there is no First Amendment right of access
to grand jury proceedings" in light of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 499.
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have the obligation to address it and to do so carefully. To that
degree, I agree with Judge Trager. The judge in the Lewinsky case,
as every judge, had an obligation to consider what could have been
public or not and to parse it probably more carefully than what was
done.
In the end, that is what the circuit court said. The circuit court
sent it back to the district court judge to parse more carefully and
to see if anything could be public, at least the docket entry.
13
Thus, I think the system in fact worked and our integrity was
maintained.
JUDGE MARTIN: A brief sur-rebuttal. One of the problems
with secret proceedings is that they are secret. If the secrecy really
works, then the press is not aware of the proceeding and cannot do
its job, and I say this even though I am not necessarily a great fan
of the press in all instances. But the fact is that if a proceeding is
truly secret, and the only ones who are aware of it are the parties
who want to keep it secret and the court, then the only one who
can look at the question whether there is a legitimate interest in
keeping it secret is the court.
I agree with all the considerations of grand jury secrecy and I
think it will be a rare instance when a judge will mandate public
disclosure. But the fact is that the parties come to us for various
types of relief in the course of a grand jury proceeding. It may well
be that there are certain parts that should not necessarily be secret,
and we are the only ones who can raise the issue.
JUDGE COTE: 14 I want to add just one example to follow up
on Judge Martin's remarks. Take, for instance, contempt proceed-
ings in connection with grand jury testimony. Contempt proceed-
ings customarily are not secret. They are litigated in open court and
people will or will not testify when immunized, and the court has
13 Id. at 504.
14 United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. A
graduate of St. Mary's College at Notre Dame and Columbia University Law
School, Judge Cote was appointed to the federal bench in 1994. She served
previously in the Department of Justice as the Special Assistant to the Chief of
the Criminal Division, in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York as the first woman Chief of the Criminal Division, and as
a partner in the law fu-r of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler.
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to decide whether to try to compel such testimony by imprison-
ment, etc. Important public policy is worked out in the context of
contempt proceedings.
Thus, in one sense it is absolutely essential to the way a grand
jury operates to get every person's testimony before it. In another
sense, it is ancillary and there are other public policy issues being
worked out, and they are best resolved in a public forum. This
appropriately allows everyone to judge whether this part of the law
is working or not working.
DEAN WEXLER: I would like to now entertain some questions
from the audience. Go ahead, Judge Borman.
JUDGE BORMAN: How does the panel feel about the
possibility of a party seeking access to the questionnaires of the
people who would be on the grand jury after indictment because
they want to challenge a grand jury selection process, going even
into the questionnaires of the grand jurors themselves? Is that
something that you would say is private or public?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: In our federal trial juries we certainly
have had challenges to the racial and ethnic makeup of the trial
jury. I have not seen one, but it does not mean that there is no
basis to make that challenge. Just to take a quick shot at respond-
ing to your question, however, I do not see why that would have
to be confidential. It does not seem to me that confidentiality
would protect what the secrecy was intended to protect. Thus, the
identity and racial make up of the jury should remain secret, but
the process of how we select our jury members can be open.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I thought the panel really illuminated
the distinction between the court and the grand jury as separate
institutions. What does the panel think about the role of the judge
in protecting the grand jury's secrecy? The front page of today's
New York Times has what Times counsel calls imaginative reporting
and what some people might call a massive grand jury leak coming
out of the Sotheby's matter. 15 What does the panel perceive as its
15 Douglas Frantz et al., Ex Leaders of Two Auction Giants Are Said to
Initiate Price Fixing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at Al (reporting that the
prosecutors in a federal antitrust investigation of Sotheby's and Christie's auction
houses were given evidence of a scheme to limit competition by fixing
commissions of buyers and sellers that was set in motion by the chairmen of the
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obligation with respect to a breach of grand jury secrecy? I am
making reference to Judge Starr and the Lewinsky matter as well.
JUDGE MARTIN: I think the problem is that it is almost
impossible to determine if there has been a leak. How do you know
anything has been leaked from a grand jury? There is nothing that
prohibits a witness before a grand jury from going out and talking
to whomever he or she pleases. 6
Now, since the press may not want anyone to know who their
source is, we see the frequently cited "people close to the investi-
gation." Well, a witness who goes before the grand jury is certainly
"close to the investigation." Absent a well-litigated motion in the
context of a criminal indictment, we really do not have the
resources to go out and conduct an investigation to try and find out
what is happening.
DEAN WEXLER: Okay, let us go to our next hypothetical,
which relates to decisions on juvenile offender status. In federal or
state criminal proceedings involving juvenile offenders, the
determination of whether the defendant should be afforded juvenile
offender status or treated as an adult can be pivotal. Often the
prosecution and defense each urge that the determination itself be
made in secret hearings and deliberations. But in certain cases,
because of the impact of the crime on the community, it may be
very important, whichever way the decision about juvenile offender
status comes out, for the public to understand the justification for
the decision and have confidence that it was reached for proper
reasons. To what extent should the judge reach out and try to find
two companies).
16 In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d at 498. In describing the
atmosphere surrounding the grand jury investigation of President Clinton and
Monica Lewinsky, the Dow Jones court noted the following:
Since mid-January the press has staked out the courthouse, photograph-
ing and attempting to intercept anyone who, because of his or her
suspected status as witness or lawyer in the investigation, might shed
light on the grand jury's progress. Some individuals have paused to
give their versions of what transpired during their grand jury appear-
ances; others have refused to be interviewed or to give a public
statement.
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justification for opening the determination when the parties are
pressing for secrecy?
JUDGE TRAGER: Well, federal law provides that the decision
whether a juvenile should be treated as an adult is to be made
behind closed doors. 7 If in fact the determination is that the
juvenile should be treated as an adult, then the entire proceeding,
including that decision, generally becomes a public record. 18 But
if the decision is to maintain the juvenile status, presumably the
entire proceeding, and the reasons for that result, would remain
secret.
This hypothetical is based upon a case that I had before me, the
Crown Heights/Lemrick Nelson case.' 9 In adjudicating that case,
17 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1994). Section 5038(a) requires that "[t]hroughout and
upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be
safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons." Id. The only persons privy
to the juvenile records are the judge, the juvenile's counsel and the government.
Id. § 5038(c). The statute further provides that the "[d]istrict courts exercising
jurisdiction over any juvenile shall inform the juvenile, and his parents or
guardian, in writing in clear and nontechnical language, of rights relating to his
juvenile record." Id. § 5038(b).
18 Id. § 5038(e).
'9 United States v. Nelson, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2320 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
8, 1994), vacated, 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995), remanded, 921 F. Supp. 105
(E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122
(1997). In Nelson, a sixteen year old defendant was charged with using force and
willfully injuring or attempting to injure Yankel Rosenbaum, an Orthodox Jew,
because of his religion. Nelson, 68 F.3d at 585. The narrative of events is as
follows: In August of 1991, a Hasidic motorist accidently struck two African-
American children in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New York. Id. As
a crowd of predominantly African-American onlookers gathered, a rumor spread
amongst them that the responding paramedics focused their treatment on the
injured Hasidic driver rather than the two injured children, trapped beneath the
automobile. Id. As a result, a riot ensued. During the course of the riot, Yankel
Rosenbaum, a rabbinical student, was stabbed to death by Lemrick Nelson. Id.
at 586. The incident sparked a firestorm of controversy throughout the press and
public of the greater New York City area. The defendant was sixteen years old
when the incident occurred and nineteen years old when the United States filed
an indictment against him. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. at 108. Eventually, the
defendant was tried as an adult. In October 1992, Nelson was acquitted by a
Brooklyn jury of intentional murder, murder by depraved indifference, and first
and second degree manslaughter. Robert D. McFadden, Teen-Ager Acquitted in
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I had to determine initially whether to treat Lemrick Nelson as a
juvenile. Considering the public interest and the public controversy
surrounding the matter, a federal judge - even with lifetime tenure
- must consider the question of public confidence where a critical
decision is being made in secret with no reasons given to the
interested communities.
The government, and especially the defense, had no interest in
having disclosure. The press did intervene, but, to be truthful about
it, they were somewhat my tool. The press' intervention led me to
Third Circuit case law that assisted me in opening the proceedings
to the public."0 My real reason for this holding was not that I was
trying to cater to the press, but that courts cannot make such
important decisions without publicly giving the reasons for those
decisions, and considering the public controversy surrounding the
case and the public interest in the issues. Thus, the federal courts
as an institution - and in my view I was representing the judiciary
here - had an independent interest in disclosing whether or not the
public was interested at all in this controversy. To the extent a
statute requires unnecessary secrecy, it is a very dangerous matter.
It is one thing if the decision was made in open court to thereafter
proceed in secrecy. In that event, at least the public would have
known what the basis was for this "irrational" and "crazy decision"
I made; a decision, by the way, which was reversed.21 I thought
then, and still think now, that the public had a right to know about
it. Ultimately, as judges we have an interest in letting the public
know what we are doing and why we are doing it, even if the
parties do not care.
Slaying During '91 Crown Heights Melee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al.
In 1997, Nelson was convicted on federal charges of violating Yankel
Rosenbaum's civil rights. He is currently serving a nineteen and one-half year
sentence at a federal prison in Beaumont, Texas. Joseph P. Fried, Following Up:
Appeals Continue for 2 Convicted in 1991 Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000,
at A41. Nelson is currently appealing his 1997 conviction. Mark Hamblett, New
Trial Sought Over Crown Heights Jury Pool, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 2000, at 1.
20 United States v. A.D. PG Publ'g Co., 28 F.3d 1353, 1361 (3d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the notion that closure of court proceedings are justified by the policy
of rehabilitation of juvenile defendants).
21 Nelson, 68 F.3d at 591.
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JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: But of course you did open the
proceedings in the Lemrick Nelson case, because it had already
been tried in state court and there was no one in town who did not
know the name, Lemrick Nelson.
I believe that it is more instructive to examine the more typical
cases confronted by judges involving juveniles. Suppose some
young person is being investigated or has been charged, and the
question presented is whether these proceedings should be sealed.
Certainly, the word of the day is "balancing." You must have heard
it a thousand times already today. You will balance what might be
the public's interest with the interest of this particular juvenile.
This problem seems to me to be a fairly easy one to solve.
With the typical juvenile, I do not see why you cannot redact the
caption and take your reasons public. Why can't this juvenile be
Juvenile M, or Juvenile S? It is done all the time. We always have
cases captioned In re M or In re S. Lemrick Nelson had to be done
publicly, because there was very little privacy interest left to
protect. The man had been tried right here and the whole world
knew it.
So it is, again, a unique case from which I am afraid to
generalize bad principles. Typically, it seems to me that there is a
privacy interest in juvenile proceedings, but the court's reasoning
can be made known to the public by the simple method of
redacting the caption.
JUDGE KOELTL: I would also be troubled if the statute
provided that these proceedings cannot be disclosed, and then for
the court to say, well, there are other interests involved that
perhaps were not taken into account when the statute was passed.
I hasten to add that I am not familiar with what the statute provides
in circumstances such as these. One of the important institutional
considerations that we have is to follow the law as the law is. In
the same way that grand jury secrecy is provided for in Rule
6(e),22 and we have to make good faith decisions as to whether
22 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e)(2) provides:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording
device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph 3(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters
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the law applies or it does not apply in a given case, so too we
would have to follow the law in this case. In the one case that I did
have involving a question with respect to a juvenile, there was
never any issue of whether it should be public, because there was
a determination that the individual was not subject to juvenile
offender status and the entire proceeding was public. I think,
therefore, that our institutional considerations are within the
framework we are given.
JUDGE TRAGER: Do I get a rebuttal? The issue here is a pure
matter of statutory interpretation. The Third Circuit, much to my
delight and amazement, in order to avoid constitutional issues, read
the statute in a narrow way that permitted me, despite what I
thought was its clear language, to achieve an appropriate goal.23
While I believe that Judge Scheindlin is correct when she says that
with most cases you can redact the case caption, and the public
interest concern is disposed of, this is not always the case. My
concern stems more from the very fact that we have such a statute
in the first place, because I think that it is not just the high
publicity of the case that matters. What is critical are the numerous
decisions that different judges will make over time, which educate
judges and the public about what the appropriate standards and
considerations are in deciding a particular issue. If all is secret and
we are all none the wiser, then I do not know what other judges
based their reasoning on and they cannot know what I based my
decision upon. This is the paramount concern. Giving the statute a
broad reading, therefore, would be inimical to not only our own
enlightenment as judges but to the public discourse as well.
DEAN WEXLER: Let us now move to the criminal area, and
discuss participation in feigned proceedings. In unusual circum-
occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in
these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6
may be punished as a contempt of court.
Id.
3 A.D. PG Publ'g Co., 28 F.3d at 1361 (holding that the Juvenile
Delinquency Act affords district court judges the requisite discretion to regulate
access to the record of proceedings on a case-by-case basis through a balancing
of interests of the juvenile and the First Amendment rights of the public).
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stances, in order to protect the security of a cooperating witness or
defendant in a serious criminal case, the judge will be made aware
of or even participate in proceedings that are designed to mask the
fact that the person is cooperating with the government. This may
take the form of setting a sham trial date to make it appear that a
defendant or witness is hostile to the government and is being
actively prosecuted. Under what circumstances and to what extent
should a judge participate, though arguably for powerful reasons,
in what is essentially a misleading statement?
JUDGE COTE: I think the judge should not participate in any
such proceeding. I am not quite sure what a sham trial date means.
I am assuming under the hypothetical that the defendant has
actually been indicted and deserves a trial date. Thus, in all
honesty, it would only be a sham if a guilty plea had been entered
or if it were the judge's practice not to set trial dates.
As you know, it is common practice for many of us to try to
set trial dates as soon as the case is before us or at the earliest
opportunity that makes sense, unless there is some good reason not
to because of the complexity of the case. For instance, you would
not immediately set a trial date in a death penalty prosecution
where you need to wait and see what the Justice Department is
going to do. But if the court allows itself to do anything that is
misleading, I think it is very undermining. I think that ultimately
all parties, the public and our colleagues need to think of us as
open, frank, and honest. There is no benefit to the government or
cooperators, ultimately, for us to be involved in anything that is
misleading.
JUDGE STEIN: I agree with Judge Cote. Part of it is how we
have defined the term "sham trial." Everyone is in favor of
motherhood and apple pie; everyone is opposed to misleading and
sham things. I include myself as someone who is opposed to sham
proceedings.
As Judge Cote does, I try to set a trial date as early in the
proceeding as practicable in order to give some certainty to the
proceedings and to help the litigation move forward to an end
point. In the course of litigation, defendants will peel off and enter
into plea agreements with the government. The trial date, however,
is still set on the court calendar, as long as at least one remaining
defendant is still going to trial. That is not a sham trial date as I
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see it. It may be a sham in the sense that some people are
cooperating. But it is not a sham because at least one person is
going to trial.
With that definition, I have no problem in there being a trial
date, even though some people are cooperating and the remaining
defendants may not be aware of that. In the typical case where the
issue is relevant - a multi-defendant case - many of the co-defen-
dants seem to know a lot more than the judges, and they instantly
know who is cooperating and who is not. But it is not because of
anything that the judge has done.
JUDGE MARTIN: Let me take the other view a little bit.
While I agree with most of what Judge Cote said, it is hard to be
absolute in any of these areas. Let us assume for a minute that a
prosecutor comes to you and says, "Judge, today you are supposed
to be sentencing an individual who was a major informant in a
Colombian drug prosecution. We have information that the drug
lord in Colombia has his henchmen at the home of this individual,
and if there is anything that indicates that this individual has been
cooperating, they intend to kill his wife and children. What we
were hoping we would do today is have you sentence him under
the guidelines to the guideline, but not actually sign the judgment
of conviction. And that subsequently we could have another
proceeding in which the actual sentence is imposed."
Personally, I would have a hard time in that circumstance
saying, "Sorry, I am not going to get involved." I think it presents
a difficult question, but ultimately what I would hope is that we
would try to do that which we think is right in the circumstance
and that which we think the public, upon knowing the entire facts,
would agree with us is right.
JUDGE COTE: Just to take on your hypothetical, is the
sentence a real sentence? Are you articulating in court all of your
reasons? Is all that you are doing is not filing the judgment of
conviction?
JUDGE MARTIN: No. What I am going to say in court is as
follows: "The guideline range here is three hundred fifty months to
life and it is the judgment of the court that you are hereby
sentenced to custody of the Bureau of Prisons."
JUDGE COTE: Is that the sentence that you are ultimately
going to impose?
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JUDGE MARTIN: No. Ultimately, I am probably going to give
him time served. He is cooperating. The reason people want to kill
him and his family is because they think he is going to cooperate.
DEAN WEXLER: Well, I think that sort of moves us directly
to the next problem where we will assume that there are no
elements of deception and it is a little closer to what Judge Martin
JUDGE TRAGER: Before you move on, would you like
another hypothetical similar to Judge Martin's?
DEAN WEXLER: Sure.
JUDGE STEIN: Before you get to the other hypothetical, I
must say, Judge Martin, that is quite a problem. [laughter]
DEAN WEXLER: I was letting you off the hook there.
JUDGE STEIN: You certainly have put the issue very starkly.
The way to solve this issue is to find some way to have it be a
genuine sentence, but to find a provision that allows you to change
it for cooperation at some point in the future.
JUDGE MARTIN: No. No. None of this wishy-washy stuff!
Let's change the facts and make it more interesting. [laughter]
JUDGE STEIN: You have put the issue starkly.
JUDGE COTE: I think that you either seal the courtroom at
sentencing or you adjourn the sentence. But you cannot pronounce
a sentence that is not the real sentence.
JUDGE TRAGER: Well, are you persuaded that even if you
adjourn the sentence they are going to think that something is
wrong and they will waste these people?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Exactly. I will jump right in, Judge
Martin, and defend you because I am in trouble here anyway.
[laughter]
To take your side of it, the main point of it is that it is a one
in a thousand sentencing scenario. And that is the point you have
to understand. There is the rare, rare moment when you know that
in Colombia the house is surrounded with guns. And you know that
an adjournment is as big a tip-off as an unreasonably low sentence.
Either way the message is clear: this is a cooperator in a major
case. So for this one and only time we have the flexibility to make
this exception. And I am not troubled that Judge Martin would do
such a thing. [laughter]
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JUDGE TRAGER: I was just going to say, Judge Martin's
hypothetical is wonderful. It is an easy one. I had a more difficult
one. In my case there were two defendants. One had already
publicly indicated he would take a plea. With respect to the
remaining defendant, there was a question of a conspiracy to
murder the cooperating witness. Were the second, now cooperating,
defendant to take a plea, at that point it would be clear that the
investigation of the attempted murder would come to an end. So,
at the joint request of the government and the defense, I resched-
uled the trial for some time later, knowing very well that the
defendant would take a plea. By simply adjourning the case,
nothing would appear on the calendar that would even suggest that
the second defendant was cooperating.
It was not as dramatic a situation as Judge Martin's hypotheti-
cal. I was not fearing for the loss of someone's life because the
targets were being monitored. Nevertheless, I recognize that my
solution jeopardizes public reliance on the integrity of our judicial
system. Still, there was a conspiracy to murder a cooperating
witness about which I had some concerns.
But I have to tell you, although Judge Cote's point is well
made, the issue is still troubling. I looked for another way to avoid
having to engage in this charade, but I was unable to find one. The
government persuaded me that there was no other way to resolve
the situation without compromising the investigation. If I could
have found another way that avoided the sham trial date, I certainly
would have chosen it. I was not happy about the choice I faced.
DEAN WEXLER: Have any of you accepted a secret guilty
plea or had closed sentencing proceedings on the theory that you
were protecting a cooperating defendant?
JUDGE MARTIN: Well, going back historically, we used to
take sealed pleas all the time. There was a change in the Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines and now the government cannot consent
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to a sealed plea. 4 They are supposed to get permission in ad-
vance.
25
Today, the defendant comes before the court. Defense counsel
then indicates that the defendant will plead guilty, but then adds,
"If it becomes known that my client is going to plead guilty it will
indicate that he is an informant. The safety of him and his family
will be in jeopardy. And I would ask that you seal the courtroom."
As a Judge, you turn to the government and say, "What is the
government's position?"
The government then replies, "As you know, Your Honor, we
cannot consent."
I would say, "Fine. Do you agree with the defense counsel that
if this is made known to the public this defendant's life is in
jeopardy and there could be danger to his family?"
And they say, "Yes." And then I seal the proceeding.
JUDGE KOELTL: There is one slight variant to that. I am
concerned about the First Amendment interests in an open
26 beasocourtroom, not because of the importance to the judiciary of
24 "The Government should take a position on any motion to close a judicial
proceeding, and should ordinarily oppose closure; it should move for or consent
to closed proceedings only when closure is plainly essential to the interests of
justice." 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (2000). Section 50.9 sets forth several guidelines to be
followed in the event closure is necessary. These guidelines require the lack of
any reasonable alternative to closure allowing for the protection of the interests
at stake. Id. § 50.9(c)(1). The guidelines also require closure to be minimized,
adequate notice of any proffered closure to be given to the general public, and
any request for closure to be made on the record if possible. Id. §§ 50.9(c)(3),
(c)(4).
25 The United States Attorney's Manual mandates that a closure motion
cannot be sought "without the express authorization of the Deputy Attorney
General." United States Attorney's Manual § 9-5.150, available at h t -
tp://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm. In the
event a closure motion is sought, the U.S. Attorney should contact the Criminal
Division, the Policy and Statutory Enforcement Unit and the Office of
Enforcement Operations, or the appropriate division of the Department of Justice.
Id The manual, moreover, requires that procedures of § 50.9 of the Code of
Federal Regulations be adhered to. Id.
26 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
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having open courtrooms, but because of the constitutional require-
ments of the First Amendment and the cases that have interpreted
the First Amendment in terms of open courtrooms.27 Thus, when
there is an effort to seal the courtroom, it is something that does
require the showing, and if we are to follow the law it does require
the showing.
There is a way to work that out. You can schedule the plea at
the end of the day when there is no one there. When you do that,
almost invariably, the motion to seal the courtroom is mooted out
because theie is no one there. You are then left with the issue of
the transcript and whether the transcript of that plea will be a
public record. And if, as will often be the case, the transcript of the
proceeding itself indicates that the disclosure at that time will result
in any possible physical danger to the defendant or members of the
defendant's family, then there certainly is a compelling reason to
seal the transcript until such time as it becomes public.
I had a similar situation in the other part of the hypothetical,
where I had a defense witness who could not testify in open court
because the nature of the witness's testimony was such as to put
the witness in danger. So you had the defendant arguing for a
sealed courtroom and the government saying, "We cannot take the
position that the courtroom should be closed" or "We take the
Government for a redress of grievance." U.S. CONST. amend. I. As the Supreme
Court has noted, the "right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly mentioned
in terms in the First Amendment. But... [t]he First Amendment is ... broad
enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in
the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment
of other First Amendment rights." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for
Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609-10 (holding that under the
First Amendment the state interest in safeguarding the psychological well being
of a minor and encouraging minors to come forward and provide testimony
cannot justify a statute requiring trial judges to exclude the press and general
public from a courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex offense
trial); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding
that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit within the First and Fourteenth
Amendments); United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that a district court is vested with "broad discretion" in determining whether a
substantial probability of danger will result from the lack of closure of trial
proceedings).
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position that the courtroom should be open." This is a good
example of the court applying the law of the First Amendment. I
ended up scheduling it at a time when the courtroom was open and
no one came in.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Again, it is a matter of balance and
degree. I think if it is rarely used, as opposed to frequently used,
parties will begin to over-ask for this closing of the courtroom.
That is what we have to be aware of. There are the rare occasions
where you really should seal a plea, and there is a mechanism to
do it, as we have all reported here.
But what happened in the state courts, anyway, was an awful
lot of trials where an undercover officer testified in narcotics
cases. 28 The state courts were routinely asked to close the criminal
trial at the point when the undercover witness testified. The court,
without asking for any reasons, frequently sealed the courtroom.
29
Then, these cases found their way into the federal courts via
habeas petitions, and we had some very interesting district court
rulings that have led to an en banc decision of our circuit 3° and,
I am told, another en banc decision coming in a sister circuit.3'
And so the point is that when it is an exceptional situation there is
a way to do it. And it is sometimes the right thing to do. But what
we have to guard against is the abuse of it and prevent the
exception from becoming routine.
28 See, e.g., People v. Vera, 685 N.Y.S.2d 659, 659 (App. Div. 1999)
(reviewing testimony of participants in a street-level drug operation); People v.
Akaydin, 685 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 93 N.Y.2d 965
(1999) (reviewing evidence indicating that defendant participated in sale of
narcotics to an undercover police officer); People v. Ramos, 662 N.Y.S.2d 739,
744 (App. Div. 1997) (examining the testimony indicating that defendant
purchased narcotics from an undercover police officer).
29 See Vera, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 659; Akaydin, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 738; People v.
Rivera, 673 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (App. Div. 1999).
30 See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(holding that a "trial judge, having already considered closure during the
testimony of one witness as an alternative to complete closure, is not required to
consider sua sponte further alternatives to closure but needs to consider only
further alternatives suggested by the parties").
31 Bell v. Jarvis, 198 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit opinion
was subsequently vacated, and a request for a rehearing en banc was granted. Id.
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JUDGE STEIN: What we are all struggling with is, again, the
powerful idea that there is a strong presumption of openness to our
judicial proceedings. It is embedded in the common law,32 in the
First Amendment,33 and the Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial.34 To the extent that we allow the exceptions to become
bigger and bigger, then we start to look like the Star Chamber,35
or lettres de cachet36 or similar items that really should not find
their way into our system of justice.
The Second Circuit in Ayala v. Speckard,37 and the Supreme
32 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978)
(examining the scope of the common law right of access); see also Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984) (observing
that "[tihe roots of open trials reach back to the days before the Norman
Conquest"); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (concluding that "the
historical evidence demonstrates that at the time our organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open").
" See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (ruling that "the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors").
14 Id. at 574.
35 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948), quoted in Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 539 (1965), also quoted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574;
see also Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1998); United States
v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1407 (2d Cir. 1993). The Star Chamber was an
"English court having broad civil and criminal jurisdiction at the King's
discretion and noted for its secretive, arbitrary, and oppressive procedures,
including compulsory self-incrimination, inquisitorial investigation, and the
absence of juries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
36 Lettres de cachet were orders issued by the French monarchs of pre-
revolutionary France consigning citizens to the Bastille. See Barrera-Echavarria
v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314, 319 (9th Cir. 1994). "The main thrust [of the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment] was directed at the invasion of privacy through general
warrants of assistance and lettres de cachet." Ford v. United States, 352 F.2d
927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37 131 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc). In Ayala, courtroom closure was
sufficiently justified during the testimony of an undercover police officer in three
separate criminal trials of drug "buy and bust" operations. The officer intended
to continue his undercover work in the same geographic area where the
defendant was arrested after testifying at trial. The court determined that
preserving the continued effectiveness of an undercover officer was a substantial
state interest. Id. at 72. Courtroom closure, therefore, was justified to protect the
state interest from severe prejudice by requiring the officer to testify in open
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Court in Waller v. Georgia,38 laid down some pretty good guide-
lines and factors that the district court has to weigh. That court
instructed the district judges to put specific findings on the record
before the courtroom can be closed for limited portions of a public
trial. The guidelines are designed to permit limited exceptions to an
open trial, which is exactly how it ought to be.
JUDGE COTE: I think one factor to consider here is whether
you are sealing something for a limited period of time that will
then become public. If it is only sealed for a limited period then,
ultimately there will be full public access to the record and a full
ability to scrutinize and understand what happened in a particular
case. That is why sealing the record of a guilty plea with a
cooperator in a dangerous case (e.g. a drug case, a gang case),
where the person is in the witness protection program, or otherwise
protected, is not troubling. The latter scenario presents a very
different situation than some of the other problems we have been
dealing with here, because ultimately there is full public access to
what has happened in the case.
DEAN WEXLER: Let's move to the civil side. Our next
hypothetical raises questions about sealed settlement agreements.
Very often, parties seek judicial approval of a confidentiality
agreement to seal a court file and proceedings in conjunction with
court. The court emphasized the limited nature of this closure since the
courtroom was sealed for only one witness and there was no limitation on the
public right to obtain the transcript of the officer's testimony. Id.
38 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). In Waller, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision to close a hearing on a motion to suppress certain wiretap
evidence. The closure of the entire suppression hearing was unjustified because
it was not clear whose privacy interests would be prejudiced by an open
courtroom and the trial court did not consider alternatives to immediate closure,
such as requiring a more detailed explanation as to the necessity of a closed
courtroom. Id. at 48.
The Court applied a four-factor test to determine the appropriateness of
courtroom closure: (1) the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no
broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) it must make findings
adequate to support the closure. Id. Applying these standards to the facts of this
case, the trial court's findings were too broad and general to justify closure of
the entire hearing. Id.
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the settlement of a civil matter. There may be a possibility that
third parties may come forward in the future seeking access to the
sealed materials; but none has presently done so. What is the
judge's obligation to take such a possibility into account in
approving the sealing order, and what should the judge do when
third parties later appear to modify that order? More broadly, how
closely should the court scrutinize and justify requests to seal
proceedings in order to protect the court's institutional integrity?
JUDGE KOELTL: I have gotten into the habit of adding a
clause at the bottom of each confidentiality agreement providing
that the court can change this confidentiality agreement at any time.
This serves to put the parties on notice that if at any time there is
a reason to change the agreement, whether it be because a third
party comes in or there is some other change in the case, the court
reserves the right to do it. Thus, the parties should not rely on the
existence of an iron-clad confidentiality agreement.
The other thing I always do is look very carefully at obligations
the parties are attempting to impose on the court. It is remarkable
the number of confidentiality agreements that contain, if you read
them, obligations on what the court can do with the allegedly
confidential materials. One example is a clause that required the
court to destroy all materials or return them to the parties. It's true!
Moreover, if the agreement has not been sufficiently carefully
worded, I add another clause that says, "This agreement does not
apply to the court or court personnel." Then the parties know that
if they give those materials to the court, those materials may well
be filed and subject to public inspection.
JUDGE COTE: I understand the focus of this to be really on
settlement agreements. My feeling is that if I am signing some-
thing, then it should be part of the public record. If you want me
to sign your settlement agreement, or so order it, I am happy to do
so, but it is going to be a public document. Further, when parties
submit settlement agreements to me that indicate that they expect
it to be sealed, we contact them and tell them if they want me -to
sign this document, it will be filed in the public record. It is their
choice.
I feel that if I am part of the process, it should be available to
the public. If a party is doing something that they do not want the
public to know about - and many parties do - then sign settlement
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agreements and give the court a stipulation of discontinuance. All
I am signing is a stipulation of discontinuance pursuant to a private
settlement agreement.
JUDGE TRAGER: Suppose the stipulation of discontinuance
says that you will retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement entered into by the parties?
JUDGE COTE: Let us say there is a dispute about that
settlement agreement and someone wants to come in and litigate it.
Then they are going to have to file all of that in the public record.
Therefore, when they want me to act, again, it is going to be part
of the public record.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I feel that this is a complicated
question and, once again, there really cannot be a blanket rule that
applies to every case. There is the odd case where confidentiality
is a term of the settlement agreement. It could arise in one of two
ways. First, as part of their negotiations, the parties believe the
settlement needs to be confidential, and they have good cause for
that and they make a showing of that good cause. The question
then becomes who would have the burden of persuading the court
at a later time to, nonetheless, disclose the settlement. It could be
the government, it could be a non-party, or it could be one of the
parties to the settlement changing their mind at a later time. Any
one of those three could come to the court, and the only question
is whether they meet the requisite burden of persuasion. Who
would have the burden to show the judge that the original agree-
ment can be modified now?
The second interesting question that presents itself occurs when
the settlement is public, but a term of the settlement agreement
states that the discovery material produced during the litigation
must be kept confidential. That is not uncommon. In fact, recently,
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
passed a new rule that there will be no public filing of any
discovery materials anywhere in the country.39 Although many
districts have had that rule as a local rule,4° it was not part of the
" FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (effective Dec. 1, 2000) (proposing that disclosure
materials not be filed with the court without an express order from the court).
40 See, e.g., LOCAL Civ. R. 5.1 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y.).
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federal rules. This new federal rule takes effect December 1, 2000,
unless Congress steps in. It has gone all the way up the ladder into
Congress. As a result, we are not going to have public filing
anyway. This discovery material will be in lawyers' offices, and
there is nothing in the Advisory Committee notes that requires
those lawyers to maintain those files.
All I am trying to say is that there is often a term of the
settlement that keeps the discovery material or the terms of the
settlement itself confidential. In either situation, to me, the ultimate
question is who has the burden to persuade the court to modify
that. I am not opposed in all instances to agreeing with the parties'
assessment if there is good cause in the first place for that
confidentiality. But, I agree with Judge Cote that it can be modified
if a showing is made. The question then presented is who has the
burden to make that showing.
JUDGE TRAGER: My only point is that I think there are
judges who are signing these stipulations and then treating them as
contractual arrangements. My view, which is in agreement with
most of you, is that we really cannot be parties to such agreements
without considering the consequences. We have an institutional
interest to protect. Even if the rules permit such agreements, our
concurrence is discretionary. We should as a matter of policy insert
a clause in every one of them reserving the right to reopen the
case. Otherwise, at some point down the road, a party will show up
and say, "Hey, Judge, I want to see this. My client was defrauded
or hurt by this guy and I need to know what was learned in your
case." Because the settlement agreement essentially is a contractual
agreement, you may be prevented from reopening it. It seems to
me that judges should not be parties to such open-ended agree-
ments.
JUDGE STEIN: Has anyone ever had an experience where a
third party came forward after a settlement agreement was sealed
and sought to make the agreement public?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I did. In a particular civil case that had
little or no public interest to anyone, the parties had agreed on
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confidentiality as a term of the settlement. 41 They convinced me
that they had good reason to do that. I agreed to it.
Two years later, a non-party walked in and said, "I need to see
that settlement. I was not here at the time. I did not even read
about it at the time. But now I have learned about it and I have a
need to see it." So the only question, which I addressed in an
opinion," was who had the burden of persuading me. Was it the
parties who originally sealed the settlement or was it the newcomer
who had not previously been heard? The interesting story, and
maybe Judge Martin knows more about this than I do, is that it was
appealed to the Second Circuit and I was eagerly awaiting their
guidance. Judge Martin was sitting by designation on the panel, but
we later heard that the appeal was withdrawn.
DEAN WEXLER: What did you decide? Who did have the
burden?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I said, in that particular case and for
that particular reason, that the newcomer had the burden of
showing the high level of need that would cause me to overturn
what the parties had relied on as a term of the settlement.43 The
outsider had the burden to show me that. And, in fact, he did.
JUDGE MARTIN: I had an interesting variation of this
problem. In a particular case, I signed a settlement agreement that
the parties wished to keep confidential.' I had, however, appoint-
ed a guardian ad litem to represent the plaintiffs. I then had to
decide a contested motion with respect to the guardian ad litem's
fee. Since he was appointed by the court and was being awarded
a substantial fee, I thought I had to, in that opinion, at least talk
about the amount he had recovered on behalf of the children he
represented.45 I received some objection as to that and was asked
41 Crothers v. Pilgrim Mortgage Corp., No. 95-4681, 1997 WL 570583
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1997).
42 See id.
41 Id. at *7 (holding that good cause exists for modification of a protective
order that was both overly broad and where circumstances at the time of its
issuance made it foreseeable that a future party would attempt to modify it).
44 Debruyne v. Clay, No. 94 Civ. 4704, 2000 WL 145752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2000).
4- Id. at **3-5 (analyzing the calculation of the guardian ad litem's fee and
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to withdraw it. I refused to do so because I thought the public
interest required an understanding of the basis on which the court
was awarding a substantial amount of money to someone the court
itself had appointed.
JUDGE STEIN: Let me go back to something Judge Scheindlin
referred to: the proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5(d).46 The proposed rule will prohibit the filing of
discovery materials. As most of you know, the local rules of the
Eastern and Southern Districts are similar on this point. They
provide that discovery materials are not to be filed with the
court.
4 7
noting the difficult legal hurdles surmounted by the guardian ad litem justifying
his compensation). The guardian's recovery was in excess of one million dollars
and the guardian's fee was approximately four hundred thousand dollars. Id. at
*1.
46 The proposed amended Rule 5(d), effective December 1, 2000, reads as
follows:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party,
together with a certificate of service, must be filed with the court
within a reasonable time after service, but disclosures under Rule
26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery requests and responses
must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court
orders filing: (i) depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for
documents or to permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for
admission.
FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (effective Dec. 1, 2000).
" Local Rule 5.1 of the Southern and Eastern District Courts of New York
reads as follows:
(a) Depositions and notices of depositions, subpoenas, interrogatories,
requests for documents, requests for admissions, and answers and
responses thereto, and other discovery requests and materials produced
in pretrial disclosure and discovery, shall not be filed with the clerk's
office except by order of the court.
(b) A party seeking relief under Rules 26 through 37 inclusive of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall quote or attach only those
portions of the depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents,
requests for admissions, or other discovery or disclosure materials that
are the subject of the motion, together with the objections thereto.
(c) When discovery or disclosure material not on file is needed for an
appeal, upon an order of the court, the necessary portion of the
material shall be filed with the clerk.
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I believe the origin of local Rule 5 lies in the space needs of
the clerk of court. That is, the court files were in danger of being
overwhelmed with discovery materials. 48 We have already dis-
cussed the presumption of openness that surrounds court proceed-
ings and specifically materials that are filed: pleadings, motions,
legal memoranda and so forth. I feel far less strongly about
materials that are not traditionally filed in the Southern District,
such as discovery materials. Assuming Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5(d) is amended as has been proposed, then no discovery
material will be filed in any federal district court in the country.
Therefore, that material will remain private, unless the parties
themselves disclose it. I am not anywhere near as offended about
people wanting discovery material to be confidential. Discovery
material is largely material that is exchanged between the parties
and not submitted to the court.
JUDGE TRAGER: I just want to add a point to that. This
situation is going to get increasingly more complex, as the courts
go to electronic case filing. The Southern District's Bankruptcy
Court as well as the Eastern District are pilot courts for electronic
filing, and they have already made great progress towards imple-
menting Electronic Court Filing ("ECF"). 4 9 ECF will be available,
LOCAL CIrv. R. 5.1 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y.).
48 In re Nasdaq Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that Local Rule 18(a) is based upon "pedestrian considerations"
and was "adopted due to the volume of discovery materials in the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
see MICHAEL C. SILBERBERG, CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YoRK § 2.10 (2d ed. 1999).
49 See Kyle Christensen, Electronic Filing: Efficient Court Documentation
Services Are on the Way, 13 NAT'L B.A. MAG. 37, 37 (1999). ECF will
streamline and automate the process of court filing, thereby increasing efficiency
and convenience for law firms and courthouses around the country. Id.; see also
Robert Plotkin, Electronic Court Filing: Past, Present, and Future, 44 B. B.J.
4, 4 (2000); Hon. Arthur M. Monty Ahalt, Remaking the Courts and Law Firms
of the Nation: Industrial Age to the Information Age, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
1151, 1158 (2000). The EFC system consists of three basic elements. First, an
electronic filing interface, which provides security and authentication for senders
and receivers of electronic information. Id. Second, a document management
service (DMS), which permanently stores data and will act as the hub for the
sharing of information between agencies, firms and the courts. Id. Third, a case
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I am sure, in the not too distant future on the Internet. What that
means is that all the briefs that previously had contained informa-
tion obtained during discovery will automatically be accessible
unless certain protective steps are taken. Our ability to maintain
confidentiality of discovery materials will diminish. Moreover, it
is almost impossible in dealing with some cases involving complex
business materials to write a decision that does not contain
confidential business information. And when I raise this issue with
the parties, they usually say: "Judge, we understand that." And
there it is. Once you go to court in this age of radical technology
change, it is almost inevitable that confidentiality cannot be
maintained to the same extent as in the past.
JUDGE COTE: I think the point that was made by Judge Stein
is an important one. I think the public's right of access to docu-
ments connected to judicial decision-making is important because
of the public's right to scrutinize our conduct to make sure that
they can comment effectively.
Discovery, however, has nothing to do with how a judge
reaches a conclusion. Discovery is, for the most part, materials that
are produced between the parties and are not, for instance,
submitted to us in support of or in opposition to a summary
judgment motion. This raises different issues. These documents do
not shed light on anything the court is doing in connection with its
decision-making process. Under our standards of discovery, it is a
very broad right of access to information between the parties.
Therefore, there is no public right to review that material in order
to make a judgment about judicial decision-making. I think that is
an important distinction to keep in mind.
DEAN WEXLER: The next hypothetical is a slight variant on
this theme. It relates to the sealing of arbitration proceedings.
Occasionally, parties to an arbitration who have involved a court
in aspects of their proceeding - for example, to compel compliance
with stipulated discovery methods or to enter an enforceable
arbitration award - will agree to seal the arbitration panel's
management system (CMS), which allows the courts to complete paper functions
like docketing and calendering in electronic format, while the CMS automatically
updates this information on the DMS. Id.
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findings as part of the settlement arrangement. If the judge
discovers items in the findings which arguably may be of potential
interest and concern to the public - for example, that a business or
business person has engaged in questionable practices - what is the
judge's obligation to insist on openness as a condition for settle-
ment?
JUDGE TRAGER: Well, Judge Weinstein this morning referred
to a case of mine.5° Essentially, it involved an arbitration dispute
in which, because of an earlier discovery proceeding, I learned of
serious allegations of fraud against one of the parties. Lo and
behold, when the parties completed discovery, they proceeded to an
international arbitration in London before a very distinguished
panel. One day, a year later, I received in the mail a motion to
enforce the judgment of this arbitration panel together with a five
hundred page opinion from the arbitration panel. And okay, I was
ready to grant the motion. Two days later there was a phone call
to chambers from the moving party. The losing party in arbitration
had agreed to pay the judgment. The parties were now asking me
to forget about the motion and, by the way, seal all the papers.
This is an instance when I said to myself, "Hey, wait a
minute." Since I was already aware of the basic allegations of
fraud, I asked myself: "What am I signing on to?" Meanwhile, I
had a lot of other work to do. The parties went forward with their
settlement, but this is why I am going to get Judge Koeltl's stamp.
Ultimately, I wrote a short opinion saying in effect: "Look guys,
when you come into federal court you may have your agenda, but
now you want to make a judge a party to your deal. I, therefore,
cannot simply just rubber stamp it." I had a student intern sit down
and read the five hundred page decision and summarize it for me.
Then, I read the critical portions. Fortunately, the arbitrators
addressed the issue of fraud, so I could rest comfortably knowing
that the distinguished panel of arbitrators had determined that they
did not think punitive damages were appropriate. The conduct was
not the type of conduct that endangered the public.
The fact that the arbitrators took these concerns into account
made me quite happy. But what if they had not? In this case I
'0 In re [Sealed], 64 F. Supp. 2d 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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could comfortably agree to file the motion under seal, but my
opinion said: "Listen guys, I am putting you all on notice: do not
think that just because you are coming to court to seal an arbitra-
tion agreement we are just going to be your enforcement mecha-
nism." Federal judges have to take an independent look at these
requests for secrecy because otherwise we are at risk of being used
as a tool to hide the existence of serious fraud and quasi-criminal
conduct.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I want to go back to the point about
discovery material, and if I can, for a moment, move away from
arbitration. While it is true that discovery often occurs between
private parties, the fact is that the lawsuit is brought in the courts.
The lawsuit is settled. The public has very little way to evaluate
whether that settlement makes any sense.
In the old days, when there was public filing of discovery
material, enterprising people could go through the record, summa-
rize it, write it up, and make an independent evaluation of whether
the settlement made sense, or was collusive, or did any good for
anybody. They could determine what the settlement was really all
about. The lack of public filing under the new proposed Rule 5(d)
is no small issue.51 In fact, I wanted to refer to the Agent Orange
case.52 It is a little bit old now, but some of the hypotheticals that
we developed here come out of that case.
One of the terms of the Agent Orange settlement was that the
discovery material would be maintained in confidence and would
not become publicly available.53 After the settlement was put to
bed, so to speak, an outside party, the Vietnam Veterans of
America, came to the court and said, "Wait a minute. We want
access to that discovery material. And we are not interested in this
private agreement that resulted in the settlement. We have a right
to see what was turned up." I should think this would resonate with
some of you with respect to the tobacco litigation.54 What was
"' See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
3 Id. at 143.
5 See, e.g., In re Tobacco Litig., 192 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Currently,
there are a dozen separate tobacco suits pending before Judge Jack B. Weinstein
in the Eastern District Court of New York, and these cases have recently been
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found in all that discovery? We as the public have some desire to
know what you turned up in years of litigation. If the tobacco
discovery was capped with confidentiality, we would be five years
behind where we are now.
So in the Agent Orange case, the Vietnam Veterans of America
came in and made a motion to the court claiming that despite the
fact that confidentiality was part of the settlement, they wanted to
see it.55 Again, the issue was who had the burden there, and the
court held that because the sealed information was of the greatest
public interest, the party that wanted to maintain the confidentiality
would have to show good cause for continuing the protection.56
So the court shifted the burden back. The burden was not placed
upon the outside parties seeking to reopen the case but on the
parties to the settlement agreement.
DEAN WEXLER: I think we can move now to our last
hypothetical concerning unpublished opinions. Appellate courts
frequently hand down "unpublished" decisions, which are not
widely distributed and, more importantly, are not precedential, at
least in the Second Circuit.58 What is the district court judge's
filed as a consolidated single class action. In re Simon (II) Litig., No. 00-CV
5332, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12611 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). The plaintiffs in
these cases (trustees of health funds, health insurance providers, and others who
have paid out medical claims to smokers) claim that the tobacco companies
conspired to deceive the public about the health problems related to smoking.
Bergeron v. Philip Morris, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d
560 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). These lawsuits have survived defendants' motions to
dismiss and have been consolidated for the purpose of settlement negotiations.
In re Tobacco Litig., 192 F.R.D. at 90. For a commentary on the recent jury
verdicts against "Big Tobacco," see generally Anthony J. Sebok, What Big
Tobacco Did Wrong, available at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/2000-
0718_sebok.html (visited Sept. 14, 2000) (examining the basis of intentional tort
liability and reasonable reliance).
" In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d at 143-44.
56 Id. at 145-47.
17 Id. at 147-48.
58 See, e.g., Marshall v. Strack, No. 98-2798, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17918
(2d Cir. Apr. 29, 1999); Ferguson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 97-7179,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1327 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1998); Lehoczky v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97-4181, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27164 (2d Cir.
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obligation when the judge becomes aware that there is a direct
contradiction between a published decision and either an earlier or
subsequent "unpublished" ruling? Similarly, how does it reflect on
our justice system if district courts are deciding cases unaware of
or unable to rely on relevant "unpublished" opinions?
JUDGE KOELTL: I am not offended by unpublished opinions.
The way in which this came about, at least to my recollection from
days of working with the bar association, is that at one time the
court of appeals affirmed or reversed judgments from the bench.
The judges would turn to each other and consult during argument
and then in the middle of the argument the presiding judge would
say, "We will affirm."
The bar association was concerned with the fact that a lawyer
could not explain to his or her client why the court rendered a
certain disposition. The court was not required to explain to anyone
in any understandable way why it reached the conclusion it did. So,
the court of appeals over time has come out with summary
dispositions. There was a time when summary decisions were
"unpublished." Now, however, they are reported by Westlaw, so
that everyone knows about them, although they are subject to the
caveat that they do not have precedential value. I am reasonably
confident that is because not as much time is spent on them due to
the volume of work before the court. Judges will, nevertheless, still
try to come out with the result that is correct for the parties,
whether the decision is published or unpublished. When district
court judges, in doing their research, come across a decision by the
court of appeals, even if it is an unpublished summary order, they
read it for understanding and guidance as to how the court of
appeals is thinking with respect to a certain issue. We certainly
take it into account. We look to see if it has been followed in other
cases and we take it into account. The situation is much better than
it used to be. If we were to go to a system that said, "No, every-
thing that the court of appeals says must be a published decision
in the sense that it can be cited," I believe that we would go back
Oct. 1, 1997); Sledge v. Guest, No. 96-2283, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 34429 (2d
Cir. Dec. 30, 1996).
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to the old way of doing things - that is, leaving the parties in the
dark.
JUDGE MARTIN: I happen to think we should not have
unpublished opinions. I think we should have opinions that are per
curiam and state that such opinions will not be given the weight of
precedent in future cases.
The main problem with unpublished opinions is that they are
not generally circulated. Thus, you are precluded from seeing what
the trend of the law is within the circuit. There are people who
come to me and say, "The Second Circuit never affirms a sanctions
order of a district court." I have been affirmed on sanction orders
several times by unpublished opinion. Others proclaim, "The
Second Circuit never affirms summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases." However, you get summary orders affirming
them all the time. In fact, these types of orders are rather routine.
We cannot continue to do this. The public cannot continue to lose
so much information. And frankly, without meaning to be critical
to my betters, there are times where I think the circuit buries
difficult issues in unpublished opinions.
JUDGE KOELTL: But "unpublished" is sort of a misnomer.
They are not really unpublished.
JUDGE STEIN: It is Orwellian to call them unpublished, since
now they are published by the electronic services.
JUDGE MARTIN: No, they are not. They are not distributed
JUDGE KOELTL: Hold on. The difference is, as some of you
know, that if it is called unpublished, if it is a summary order, it
does not come out in a slip sheet.59 If it does not come out in a
slip sheet, it is not sent to the people who normally get slip sheets,
including district court judges. District court judges read everything
the court of appeals does in the slip sheets, but we would be over-
whelmed if we had to read, in addition to that, all of the summary
orders that are issued by the court of appeals. If you are interested
in knowing whether the Second Circuit has affirmed any sanctions,
'9 A slip sheet opinion is a court ruling "that is published individually after
being rendered and then collectively in advance sheets before being released for
publication in a reporter. Unlike an unpublished opinion, a slip opinion can
usually be cited as authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (7th ed. 1999).
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all you have to do is go to Westlaw and search the Second Circuit
database for all decisions including summary orders, to find out
what the record on that is.
JUDGE STEIN: Let me make a couple of factual points to put
this in context. I went to the publication entitled Judicial Business
in the United States Courts.6' It just came out a couple of weeks
ago for 1999. It reports that the percentage of unpublished
opinions, as against all opinions, for the Fourth Circuit, is ninety
percent.61 In other words, nine out of ten of their decisions are
"unpublished." Seventy one percent of Second Circuit opinions are
unpublished. Moreover, six of the twelve circuits are at eighty
percent or more unpublished.62
60 1999 ADMiN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 49.
61 Id.
62 Id. For example, the relevant rules of three circuits are as follows. Rule
0.23 for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reads:
The demands of an expanding case load require the court to be ever
conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accordingly,
in those cases in which decision is unanimous and each judge of the
panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a
written opinion, disposition will be made in the open court or by
summary order.
Where a decision is rendered from the bench, the court may deliver a
brief oral statement, the record of which is available to counsel upon
request and payment of transcription charges. Where disposition is by
summary order, the court may append a brief written statement to that
order. Since these statements do not constitute formal opinions of the
court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all parties, they
shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or
any other court.
2D CIR. R. 0.23.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' equivalent, Rule 53(b)(2)(iv), reads
as follows: "Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law
of the case, [an unpublished opinion] shall not be cited or used as precedent (a)
in any federal court within the circuit in any written document or in oral
argument; or (b) by any such court for any purpose." 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv).
The corresponding Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rule states:
Any disposition that is not an opinion or an order designated for
publication under Circuit Rule 36-5 shall not be regarded as precedent
and shall not be cited to or by this Court or any district court of the
Ninth Circuit, either in briefs, oral argument, opinions, memoranda, or
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As it now stands, there is a significant body of appellate
decisions out there that is "unpublished." Not only are most or all
of them now published on the Westlaw or LEXIS systems, but
each one has the caption required by the relevant local rule of that
circuit stating in essence that the decision does not have prece-
dential value.63
I had more of a problem with these unpublished opinions a few
years ago when they truly were unpublished. The electronic
services either did not exist or were in limited use. An informal
consortium of large firms in Manhattan would send a clerk down
to the Second Circuit to pick up all the unpublished opinions -
they have always been available at the clerk's office - and these
firms circulated the opinions among themselves. As a result, there
were certain firms whose lawyers had easy access to the unpub-
lished opinions and others who did not by virtue of not having the
resources or ability to routinely obtain them. That situation exists
no longer. Now, anyone who has access to LEXIS or Westlaw can
study them and I believe those services are very widely available
throughout the legal profession.
Nonetheless, the unpublished opinion still strikes me as a very
odd animal because it cannot be used for precedential purposes.
There is a reason behind the unpublished opinions - the circuit
wants to resolve the case, but it does not want to have to worry
about every single word and phrase in the opinion or spend time on
the craftsmanship. Nevertheless, I am troubled by what this animal
is.
JUDGE TRAGER: Well, I would like to intervene here,
because I think this is all wrong. [laughter] I start from Judge
Martin's basic premise that it would be best to publish these
opinions. In my own view, the situation was better when the court
of appeals just affirmed without opinion, because then you knew
for certain that the case had no precedential value. Unpublished
opinions, I believe, have been an extraordinarily negative develop-
orders, except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel.
9TH CIR. R. 36-3.
63 See, e.g., supra note 62.
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ment in the law. Those who follow the law in just our circuit come
to see that incoherence is the result of the present situation. Indeed,
this point is going to be made in a forthcoming en banc opinion on
the issue of sealing the courtrooms during the testimony of
undercover cops. One of my colleagues granted a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner because the undercover police officer was
still doing work in Brooklyn. 64 He thought that was enough. A
summary order reversed him and denied the writ.65 About a
month or two later a decision by the circuit was handed down
holding that Manhattan was too broad to justify closure.66 What
does that say for the coherence of the law and people's respect for
what judges are doing? You get one panel and it yields one
particular result; you get another panel and it reaches a directly
opposite result. Again, this is very destructive to the law.
JUDGE COTE: But you do not have to go to unpublished
opinions to get incoherence.
JUDGE TRAGER: Well, that is true. But those lawyers who
honestly try to follow the rule and do not cite unpublished opinions
are put in a worse position than the lawyer who ignores the rule
against citation, knowing very well that it will affect the district
judge. It has to. Moreover, I cannot comprehend how a panel of
three judges thought a reversal was so clear that it did not warrant
a full opinion.
This is a very serious problem that must be addressed. The
federal courts have an institutional need to address this question as
the present situation yields incoherence in the law and unfairness
to the parties before the court. The disposition of a matter cannot
come to rest on whether an opinion was published or not when the
issues are identical.
JUDGE STEIN: It is also a misnomer to say that they are
without precedential value.
JUDGE TRAGER: I agree.
JUDGE MARTIN: While the circuit court of appeals says it is
not precedential when it affirms in an unpublished opinion, the
64 Vaughn v. Artuz, No. 97-2442, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20641 (2d Cir.
Mar. 13, 1998) (unpublished table decision).
65 id.
66 Brown v. Andrews, 180 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 1999).
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district court opinion is cited thereafter as a decision that has been
affirmed by the Second Circuit.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Actually, I agree with what Judge
Trager said on this issue, but I wanted to point out one more thing.
The legend that we get across the top of those Second Circuit
opinions is not uniform throughout the country. Interestingly, some
circuits have a different legend and I saw one recently, the Tenth
Circuit's, that said you may cite this non-published opinion if
absolutely necessary.67 I thought that was wonderful and I imme-
diately cited the case in one of my opinions.
JUDGE COTE: Well, I am just going to take an opposite point
of view here. Well, maybe not opposite. I do not see any problem
with this. I think we have plenty to read as it is in terms of the
workload of the circuit. Obviously, it can be abused from case to
case and it affords judges the opportunity to duck hard questions.
By and large, however, they probably do not need to write as much
as they write now.
We generally speak about moving the law forward, and adding
to the growth of the law. This does not mean that we need to write
opinions re-adopting what was said ten years ago. We do not need
to write on everything. Everything has a right to be appealed.
JUDGE STEIN: A better way to handle that is simply to write
"affirmed on the opinion below."
JUDGE TRAGER: That's even better!
DEAN WEXLER: I first want to thank our panel for letting us
hear a frank discussion by federal judges on the important topics
of secrecy and the courts. And I want to thank the audience for
remaining with us until almost five o'clock on a Friday afternoon.
You were terrific. Thank you for being with us today.
67 10TH CIR. R. 36.3. An "unpublished decision may be cited if (1) it has
persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in
a published opinion, and (2) it would assist the court in its disposition." Id.
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